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Canada committed forces to the American-led Coalition in the 1990-1991 campaign to 
liberate Kuwait (Operation DESERT SHIELD and 
Operation DESERT STORM). The Navy played 
an important role in the naval portion in this 
campaign known as Operation DESERT STORM. 
Canadian CF-18s provided defensive combat air 
patrols over the Persian Gulf region (less Kuwait 
and Iraq). Canadian soldiers helped guard 
prisoners of war, defend airfields and provide 
security for the 1st Canadian Field Hospital 
that provided additional health service support. 
While all of these were important contributions, 
Canada also provided assistance for Operation 
DESERT SHIELD. A number of states deployed 
forces to Saudi Arabia to aid in that Kingdom’s 
defence should Iraqi forces have attacked. 
Some Canadian contributions to this operation 
remain unacknowledged. The massive victory 
in DESERT STORM was a direct result of the 
efforts expended in DESERT SHIELD. The two 
operations comprise the 1991 Gulf Campaign. 
Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Goose Bay played 
a little known but remarkable role in Operation 
DESERT SHIELD in August 1990. It was, in fact, 
the first unit of the Canadian Forces to support 
the 1990-1991 Gulf Campaign by acting as a 
transit station for the US Air Force’s Military 
Airlift Command (MAC) as well as other US Air 
Force formations during Operation DESERT 
SHIELD. 
Problem
Neither Canadian nor American official histories mention anything about the role of 
Goose Bay in the airlift that formed the backbone 
of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Both bases have 
been used by the US military as transit stations 
for deployments outside of continental North 
America. The histories of the war produced in 
Canada tend to focus on the units that participated 
in Operation DESERT STORM yet provide a good 
account of the lead-up to Canadian participation 
in DESERT SHIELD.1  This is, in part, is due to 
the fact that Canadian work tends to focus on 
overseas operations where forces are placed in 
harm’s way. The United States Transportation 
Command (TRANSCOM) Official History of the 
1991 Gulf Campaign, memorably titled So Many, 
So Much, So Far, So Fast, provides a detailed 
account of both the airlift and sealift operations 
supported by a significant amount of statistical 
evidence. It identifies some of the American bases 
in Europe as well as European military bases 
used to support the airlift in its discussion of 
routes, but there is no mention of any Canadian 
bases.2  The US Department of Defense’s report 
to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
War (CPGW) never mentions Goose Bay or even 
the use of Canadian airspace. It does, however 
mention the following: 
•	 Canadian	 participation	 in	 the	maritime	
intercept operations, 
•	 the	Canadian	 contribution	 of	 intelligence	
personnel to United States Central Command 
(CENTCOM) headquarters, 
•	 Canadian	participation	 in	 the	RED	FLAG	
series of fighter exercises held at Nellis AFB, NV, 
•	 the	 Canadian	 contribution	 of	 a	 CF-18	
Squadron, 
•	 the	loan	of	250	chemical	sniffers,	and	
•	 Canadian	contractors	associated	with	some	
U.S. military equipment.3 
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CPGW acknowledges and heaps praise on MAC 
as well as the bases that supported MAC aircraft 
in transit to the Persian Gulf. Airlift allowed the 
United States to react quickly, which was crucial 
for the successful defence of Saudi Arabia.4  It has 
since come to light that Saddam Hussein had 
little intention of invading Saudi Arabia, but in 
August 1990, this was not known. For example, 
General Chuck Horner, USAF (Retired), then 
the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, 
recalled that: “…we struggled desperately to build 
up our forces knowing that at any time the Iraqi 
Army could easily push across Saudi Arabia and 
capture not only the majority of the world’s oil 
supply but also the air bases and parts necessary 
for deploying our forces.”5  The lop-sided victory 
in Operation DESERT STORM overshadowed 
the desperation felt by the coalition in DESERT 
SHIELD. 
 So why is it the case that the role of Canadian 
bases and Goose Bay in particular have been 
overlooked? There are two reasons:
•	 The	mechanisms	of	 defence	 co-operation	
between Canada and the United States made 
this a routine manner in a time of crisis, and
•	 The	 actual	 volume	 of	 MAC	 and	 other	
USAF traffic that passed through Goose Bay 
in August 1990 became insignificant in the 
months following August 1990 for TRANSCOM’s 
historians to mention it.
Yet it must be stated that the volume of MAC 
and other USAF traffic forced CFB Goose Bay 
to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week 
for August 1990. In the eyes of those airmen 
providing support to the airlift (as well as the 
day-to-day operations in Goose Bay), this was a 
major event. 
Situation
Goose Bay had been a transit station since the Second World War for American 
transatlantic military air traffic between the 
Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe. 
The movement of aircraft from CONUS to Europe 
meant that a ‘polar circle’ route would be used. 
The first leg of the ‘polar circle’ route meant 
that aircraft starting from CONUS would travel 
through Canadian airspace and possibly use 
Canadian bases (such as Goose Bay) as transit 
stations. In the early 1950s, the American and 
Canadian governments chose to maintain the 
route and apply the NATO Status-of-Forces 
Agreement to American forces stationed in 
Canada.6  Goose Bay’s importance to the US 
military transportation network was not changed 
significantly by the increase in the average range 
of aircraft. While it would seem logical that as 
ranges increased, the requirement for transit 
stations would decrease, but the development 
of the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to 
Germany) exercises meant that the volume of 
aircraft bound for Germany would surge every 
fall. An annual increase in volume meant that 
there would be additional air traffic moving 
across the North Atlantic air routes and Canadian 
airspace. The US Air Force, therefore, needed 
bases in Northeastern North America to provide 
refuelling and maintenance services as transit 
stations. Goose Bay was a prime location, and 
in the fall of 1976, Canada and the United States 
renewed their agreement for the use of Goose Bay 
by the US Military Airlift Command. Under the 
agreement, Canada was to provide, ‘free of rent,’ 
access to the airfield, existing infrastructure and 
support services (less fuel and aircraft servicing). 
American forces would be subject to Canadian 
policies with regard to the use of equipment, 
but the agreement noted that the: “USAF shall 
be responsible for obtaining aviation fuels and 
lubricants and aircraft ground support services 
required for US Armed Forces operations…”7  
As a result, the USAF maintained a small 
detachment of aircraft maintenance personnel 
(approximately 16 strong) at Goose Bay, and 
MAC, since that time, “…moved a fair number 
of aircraft through the airport, particularly 
during the annual REFORGER…”8  The 1976 
agreement also included the clause that it was: 
“…understood that any substantial change in the 
level of US activity at Goose Bay will be subject 
to prior consultation between the parties…”9  Ten 
years later, the Canadian government signed a 
Military Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) 
with the United States, United Kingdom and 
Germany for a ten-year lease of facilities at Goose 
Bay for low-level flying training.10  Goose Bay 
became the home of the NATO Flying Training 
Centre (NFTC).
The presence of the NFTC in Labrador led to 
Goose Bay becoming a well-known name in the 
late 1980s. Since its inception, the NFTC has 
been controversial due to the low-level flying. The 
Innu have been opposed to its operations due to 
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the potential effects on the caribou herds. The 
number of training sorties in 1990 suggests that 
the pace of activity over the skies of Labrador 
was hectic:
•	 3,205	German	Air	Force	sorties,	
•	 944	Royal	Air	Force	Sorties,	
•	 1,420	Royal	Netherlands	Air	Force	Sorties.11 
The Innu argued that their safety, culture and way 
of life were in jeopardy as a result of the low-level 
flying.12  During the late 1980s, Innu protests 
(including occupations of range areas, ramps 
and other facilities) attracted both media and 
political attention.13  The situation came to be so 
politically sensitive that the Canadian government 
had to take additional security measures. The 
Base Historical Report noted that:
…on 10 Apr 90, six defendants attended 
Provincial Court and were found guilty of mischief 
resulting from charges laid at a demonstration 
held by the Innu on the base…a company of 
militia deployed to Goose Bay on 16 Apr 90 to act 
as perimeter guard to prevent incursions onto 
the aerodrome by demonstrators. Op UNIQUE 
involved 120 militia personnel from Quebec. The 
BDF was also augmented during this period by 
35 personnel from other CF units. The exercise 
remained in place until 14 Nov 90, the end of 
the allied flying season.14 
The Innu protests turned Goose Bay into a 
political sore spot for the Canadian Government 
and this one offered the potential for international 
consequences.
 In early 1990, the American government 
saw an opportunity with the drawing-down of 
the Cold War (and the reduction of the Soviet 
threat) to start changing its force postures. In 
July, MAC announced that it would withdraw 
from Goose Bay. Without a Soviet threat, the 
REFORGER exercises would not be required, and 
therefore the USAF would not have to maintain its 
detachment in Goose Bay. REFORGER ceased to 
be incredibly salient. The small USAF presence 
in Goose Bay was to be withdrawn.15  It was to 
leave a single civilian behind in Goose Bay to act 
as the Military Airlift Committee Liaison Officer 
(MACLO). The Base Historical Report for the year 
noted that: “The MACLO position has already 
made a significant impact on Operations, co-
ordinating the transition to the Canadian Forces 
of the Non-MMOU transient servicing which was 
performed by the withdrawing USAF.”16  The 
American withdrawal from Goose Bay had not yet 
been completed, but the Canadian Forces were to 
provide the maintenance services for American 
aircraft using the base as a transit station.
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
It is common knowledge that Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and that this act 
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touched off an international crisis. It is equally 
well known that the US sought to aid its primary 
ally in the Persian Gulf by rapidly deploying 
forces to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 
event that Iraqi forces might invade. On 6 August 
1990, at a meeting with high level political and 
military representatives from the United States, 
King Fahd granted permission for American and 
other forces to assist in the defence of Saudi 
Arabia. The Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, 
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, US Army, 
requested that forces begin moving immediately 
to Southwest Asia (SWA).17  Such speed meant 
that they would have to be airlifted. CONUS-
based forces would be moved through Europe to 
SWA, and this meant ‘polar circle’ routes would 
be used. 
The Canadian government was somewhat 
surprised by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and it 
took a few days to consult with allies and develop 
a response. Prime Minister Mulroney spoke 
with President Bush on two occasions shortly 
after the invasion, namely on 4 and 6 August 
1990.18  Three days later, the National Defence 
Operations Centre activated a Crisis Action Team 
to coordinate the Canadian military response, 
which would be centred on a Naval Task Group.19 
Goose Bay, however, was far from the centre of 
international attention, and it seemed unlikely 
that an air force base in one of the more remote 
locations in Canada would play a role in the 
Gulf Crisis. Military Airlift Command, however, 
was more prophetic. One of the Aircraft Control 
staff, Private Jeffrey Noel, noted in his journal 
that MAC reported that it might need to send 
some traffic through Goose Bay as a result of 
the invasion.20  On 3 August 1990, there was a 
noticeable increase in the number of MAC flights 
being pushed through Goose Bay. Private Noel 
noted that it was: “…averaging about two an hour 
versus two or three a day.”21  This, of course, was 
occurring as Hurricane Bertha was ravaging the 
eastern seaboard of the United States. Since that 
time, Hurricane Bertha has entered the popular 
memory as the ‘Perfect Storm.’22  Additional 
C141 Starlifter of the United States Military Airlift Command on final
approach to CFB Goose Bay on its return flight from the Persian Gulf.
Opposite: During the initial stages of Operation DESERT 
SHIELD an almost constant flow of US military aircraft 
transited CFB Goose Bay. Regular visitors were UASF 
C5 Galaxy transports.
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American personnel were assigned to the base 
to help address the increased volume. The 
meteorological section, for example, expanded 
to include two USAF forecasters.23  Two weeks 
later, a detachment of USAF Air Police arrived 
to provide security for MAC aircraft.24  The 
volume of traffic increased further on the 5 and 
6 August, and although the Bush Administration 
had convinced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
to permit foreign forces on Saudi territory, the 
volume of traffic tapered off until 10 August. 
The rapid deployment of troops requested by 
CINC CENTCOM required the creation of an 
“aluminum bridge” of aircraft that spanned 
from CONUS to Saudi Arabia.25  This “aluminum 
bridge” meant that a large volume of traffic would 
be pushed through Goose Bay. This traffic first 
appeared over the skies of Labrador on 3 August 
1990.26  As Goose Bay was also a training base, 
there were significant limitations on the airport’s 
availability. Goose Bay only handled MAC and 
other aircraft at night and dealt with fighter 
operations during the day.
The creation of an “aluminum bridge” that 
spanned from CONUS to Saudi Arabia was no 
small feat. The TRANSCOM official history listed 
the major transit bases in Europe for DESERT 
SHIELD as:
•	 Torrejon	AFB,	Spain	31%
•	 Rhein-Main	AFB,	Germany	27%
•	 Zaragoza,	Spain	18%
•	 Ramstein	AFB,	Germany	14%
•	 RAF	Mildenhall	AFB,	UK	6%
•	 Rota	AFB,	Spain	4%.27 
There was no mention of transit bases in North 
America for DESERT SHIELD. The European 
bases were mentioned primarily due to their 
provisions of services to MAC aircraft. These 
services in Europe were vital, as the airfields 
in the Middle East often did not have sufficient 
ramp space, fuelling, billeting, cargo handling or 
maintenance services.28  Private Noel’s recollection 
of the events of the night of 14-15 August 1990 
illustrates the importance of the latter:
Several airborne emergencies mixed in with the 
traffic: FLEGL 26 (C130 Herc), 21 SOB’s, #1 
Engine out; a/c did a fuel dump before landing 
safely at 0539z. Second airborne emergency on 
another Herc (FLEGL 12); 36 SOB’s, #3 Engine 
out, low oil pressure - landed safely at 0735z. 
Third emergency was on a C5 inbound with one 
engine out, one engine showing fire indication, 
72 SOB’s and class A/B/C explosives…29 
 The schedules for flights within the “aluminum 
bridge” were tight. A crew spent five-and-a-half 
hours in the air flying from Saudi Arabia to 
Spain and had a two-hour layover there. It then 
flew seven-and-a-half hours to Goose Bay and 
had a two-hour layover there. It then flew for 
seven hours to reach Travis AFB for a twelve-
hour layover before completing the process 
in reverse.30  This hectic pace could not be 
maintained without the support provided by the 
transit stations.
 Yet the provision of support did not mean 
that there were no challenges experienced by 
the USAF or the CF during August 1990. The 
events of 20 August provide a single yet powerful 
example. Private Noel recalled that on that day 
when he was: 
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…driving by the MAC ramp on our way home 
to the PMQ and noticed that it was ringed with 
portable klieg lamps. Just as we passed, the 
MAC ramp [was] lit up like a Christmas tree! [I] 
gave Tower a call when we got home and was told 
that the C5 that arrived this afternoon had a US 
Air Police unit aboard, complete with Hummer’s 
and a couple of dogs. The lights are supposed to 
block anyone from seeing what’s going on on the 
USAF ramp. The Tower actually had to request 
that the lights pointing north towards the tower 
be shutdown because they blocked out the duty 
crews view of the approach to the north/south 
runway. MAC Ops took several hours to comply 
because they had to get permission from the 
USAF in Washington to do so…31  
While the American actions may seem comically 
paranoid in trying to secure a remote location 
from hostile acts, there were other sources of 
potential interference. Private Noel recalled 
that on 30 August 1990: “Of all the things to 
happen today, the Innu decided that it was 
their time to protest low-level flying by cutting 
through the south perimeter fence adjacent to 
the USAF ramp. Don’t these people realize that 
there is a war on!”32  The American reaction 
was, understandably, fraught with alarm. The 
Base Historical Report noted that: “MP [Military 
Police] and Op UNIQUE [Airfield Defence and 
Security] forces responded to the first and only 
Innu demonstration of 1990 on 30 August and 
successfully prevented an attempted incursion 
onto the runways.”33  Given the politically-charged 
nature of the debate over low flying, this could 
have become a significant controversy. Swift 
intervention prevented a political problem from 
influencing the Coalition’s operations.
Airlift in the Operation
So how many MAC aircraft actually passed through Goose Bay on their way to and from 
the Persian Gulf in August 1990? The Base 
Historical Report stated that: 
August saw the beginning of the USAF Military 
Airlift Command’s support for Operation Desert 
Shield. Over one thousand heavy transport 
aircraft staged through Goose Bay in a 60-day 
period. The Met Section provided 1478 briefing 
[sic] to USAF crews during Aug and Sep. ATC 
Section increased personnel on shift to meet the 
demand for services created by the late night 
movements of C5s and C141s.34  
The exact number is reliant on official sources, 
and due to the reporting methodology, subject 
to interpretation. The Report noted that there 
were 2,183 USAF ‘itinerant’ flights that passed 
through Goose Bay in 1990.35  This includes the 
entire year and all USAF traffic, and as a result, 
it does not focus on purpose or destination. 
Approximately 67 per cent of the ‘itinerant’ flights 
from 1990 occurred in August and September. 
The BHR also compared annual transits by type 
of strategic airlifter or refueller, and this shows a 
significant increase from 1989 to 1990 in these 
types of aircraft. 
Figure 1: Annual Transits by Aircraft Type
A similar comparison to previous year can be 
found for the month of August 1990 in the total 
number of flights as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Annual Transits by Purpose36 
 
While the data above shows an increase in the 
number of American strategic airlift aircraft that 
passed through Goose Bay, it does not draw 
a direct link between the airlift in support of 
DESERT SHIELD and Goose Bay, although we 
would assume the increased volume is exactly 
that. 
 There is, however, other evidence. One of the 
Annexes to the Report did state that in August 
1990, USAF aircraft flew from Goose Bay to the 
following destinations:
•	 94	Flights	to	the	UK	
•	 157	Flights	to	Germany
•	 246	Flights	to	Spain
•	 7	Flights	to	Saudi	Arabia.37 
 These flights matched some of the routes 
described in the US TRANSCOM official history. 
*Jan-Mar 1991
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It is likely that the flights to the UK were bound 
for RAF Mildenhall or other USAF installations 
in the UK. The flights to Germany were bound 
for Rhein-Main AFB or Ramstein AFB and the 
flights to Spain were headed to Torrejon, Rota 
or	Zaragoza.	The	Base	Report	 also	noted	 that	
these flights represented 20 per cent of the annual 
USAF itinerants in only a single month, meaning 
20 per cent of the annual amount occurred in 8.3 
per cent of the time.38  Private Noel expressed it 
in more human terms: “Since the airlift began, 
we’ve averaged 51 MAC birds a day, with 102 
alone yesterday!”39  He went further and provided 
a more detailed analysis by noting that the:
…traffic count for the month is 7,236 - an 
increase of 1,389 over last August. That increase 
is exclusively MAC birds, but we’ve had more 
than that because the RAF stopped flying mid-
month so tack on another 400-500 movements 
to make up for them. That should put MAC 
movements around 1900 since 3 August (65 per 
day); since most MAC movements occur during 
the nightshift that makes 5 per hour per 12 hour 
night period or 1 every 12 minutes . . .40 
On 17 August 1990, the RAF suspended its 
flight operations in North America pending a 
redeployment of RAF assets to the Persian Gulf.41  
By Private Noel’s analysis, the increase in flights 
(by almost 1900) was directly attributable to 
the MAC flights in support of DESERT SHIELD. 
This is a significant difference from the 504 
flights identified in the Base Historical Report, 
but this same Report noted that almost 1500 
meteorological briefings were given to USAF 
crews in August and September 1990. If all 
flight activity matched that of the aforementioned 
USAF crew from Travis AFB, where aircraft 
that flew to the Persian Gulf via Goose Bay also 
returned through Goose Bay, then the number 
of MAC flights associated with DESERT SHIELD 
was approximately 1,000. The BHR noted that 
in August 1990, the United States was the 
destination for 487 flights.42  One could draw 
the conclusion that Goose Bay was used as a 
transit station for aircraft returning from the Gulf 
as well as a transit station for aircraft headed 
to the Gulf. The TRANSCOM official history 
stated that there were 1,668 flights in support of 
Operation DESERT SHIELD in August 1990.43  
This suggests that Goose Bay was a transit 
station for roughly two-thirds of the MAC flights 
between CONUS and the Persian Gulf in August 
1990. Goose Bay was not just one of many bases 
that supported the ‘aluminum bridge’. It was a 
significant contribution to a larger effort. MAC 
made 16,203 flights from the start of DESERT 
SHIELD to the redeployment in April 1991. Yet 
the vast majority of Goose Bay’s MAC traffic 
Several KC135 aerial tankers occupy spots on the USAF ramp at CFB Goose Bay. These particular aircraft were deployed 
to CFB Goose Bay during the initial buildup of Operation DESERT SHIELD and carried out air-to-air refuelling operations 
off the Labrador coast for fighter aircraft enroute to the Persian Gulf.
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occurred in August 1990, and over time, its 
significance to the ‘aluminum bridge’ waned with 
the volume of traffic in the Fall of 1990. 
 Goose Bay’s role in DESERT SHIELD/
STORM has been all but forgotten. While aligning 
practices in peace with those in war is one of 
the best things a military force can do (within 
legal limits of course), there are unintended 
consequences. Ironically, during the Cold War, 
the REFORGER series was a dress rehearsal 
for an unforeseen war in the Middle East. Due 
to the similarity of the airlifts associated with 
Top left: Part of the US Army’s Aviation 
Force to transit CFB Goose Bay was an 
OV 1C Mohawk light observation and 
reconnaissance aircraft.
Above left: A US Army RC-12 Guardrail electronic 
surveillance aircraft was one of the many ‘smaller’ 
American military aircraft to pass through Goose Bay. 
The RC-12 was a heavily-modified Beech King Air and 
was used as an electronic signals intelligence platform 
that operated at the forward edge of the battlefield to 
record enemy transmissions.
Above: RAF GR1A Jaguar ‘Mary Rose’ in desert 
camoflage, 28 July 1991. The markings on the side 
of the aircraft indicate that it flew 36 bombing, and 1 
strafing mission during the first Gulf War.
Above left & right: An RAF Victor aerial refuelling aircraft, 
nicknamed “Saucy Sal.”
Below left: A Pan Am Boeing 747 redeploying troops to the 
continental United States via Goose Bay.
Below right: Mission score painted on the side of another 
aerial tanker recently returned from the Gulf indicate the 
aircraft flew 66 combat support, 32 cargo and 16 other 
missions in support of the Royal Saudi Air Force.
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a REFORGER and that of DESERT SHIELD, 
the drama associated with the task has been 
reduced. In this case, the lack of drama 
contributed to Goose Bay’s role being overlooked 
by the historians in Ottawa, Washington, and at 
TRANSCOM Headquarters in Scott AFB, IL. Yet 
Goose Bay was a Canadian link in a broader 
chain of bases used to support the ‘aluminum 
bridge’ to the Persian Gulf. More importantly, 
it played a role in the liberation of Kuwait even 
before the Canadian government committed the 
Navy or for that matter, the country to that task. 
It should be remembered.
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Announcing the
7th MARCOM CONFERENCE
Maritime Command, along with the Directorate 
of History and Heritage, is holding a two-day 
conference on Canadian naval history at the 
new Canadian War Museum located at 1 Vimy 
Place (near the corner of the Ottawa River 
Parkway and Booth St.) in Ottawa on Thursday 
22 September and Friday 23 September 2005. 
Panels will convene in the Barney Danson Theatre 
at 0845 and finish at approximately 1630 on 
each day.  While topics on all aspects of naval 
history will be presented, the conference will 
emphasize the technological side of the navy’s 
weapons, platforms, and tactics during the Cold 
War Period.  There are no conference fees but 
for planning purposes those wishing to attend 
are asked to pre-register by writing to mayne.
ro@forces.gc.ca. Information packages will be 
emailed upon registration.
Call for Papers
17th Military history ColloquiuM
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
Co-sponsored by The Laurier Centre for Military 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies and the 
Canada Research Chair in Conflict and Culture, 
Department of History, University of Western 
Ontario
5-6 May 2006
The Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and 
Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, 
and the Canada Research Chair in Conflict and 
Culture, Department of History, The University 
of Western Ontario, invite proposals for papers 
to be presented at the 17th Military History 
Colloquium, to be held at the University of 
Western Ontario on 5-6 May 2006.
The primary focus will be on all periods of 
Canadian military history - pre-1914, First and 
Second World Wars, the Korean War and post-1945 
developments including peacekeeping.  Proposals 
for papers advancing new and innovative 
perspectives will receive first consideration. 
Papers addressing all facets of military history, 
including tactics and operations, social and 
cultural issues, economic impacts, and the home 
front, from the colonial era to the present day will 
be considered.  Proposals are welcome from all 
scholars, but graduate students and recent Ph.Ds 
are especially encouraged to submit.
Please submit a one-page proposal to 
Mike Bechthold, Laurier Centre for Military 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext.4594; Fax: 519-886-
5057; email: mbechtho@wlu.ca
www.canadianmilitaryhistory.com 
The deadline for proposals
is 24 February 2006.
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